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INTRODUCTION

In many ways, the 2015 term of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit with respect to international trade felt like d6ja vu.
The Federal Circuit heard a number of significant cases this year that
it addressed in one or more of the past several terms and either came
back as an appeal on a related issue or for an en banc hearing.'
Despite these lengthening cases, very few appeals have found success,
especially with regard to overturning antidumping orders.

* Ph.D., George Mason University;J.D./M.A., American University; B.A., Lock Haven
University; Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Strategic Global Management,
Temple University. Professor Fandl is also the former Chief of Staff for International
Trade and Intellectual Property at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's
International Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center.
1. See, e.g., Kevin J. Fandl, 2013 International Trade Law Decisions of the Federal
Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1375, 1409-12 (2014) (discussing Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 715 F.3d 906 (Fed. Cir. 2013), which returned to the Federal Circuit in 2015);
Kevin J. Fandl, 2010 International Trade Law Decisions of the FederalCircuit, 60 Am. U. L.
REv. 1121, 1124-27 (2011) (discussing Diamond Sawblades Mfts. Coal. v. United States,
612 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010), which returned to the Federal Circuit in 2015).
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As usual, most of the significant cases this year focused on
dumping. Some familiar cases returned to the court with arguments
over zeroing, which the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce)
2
reversed after a negative World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling,
and three cases on the Byrd Amendment, which Congress repealed
following a negative WTO ruling.' Additionally, the Federal Circuit
heard a number of interesting procedural cases this term, including
one establishing value calculations in dumping cases involving nonmarket economies,' the exhaustion of remedies requirement for
seeking relief at the Court of International Trade (CIT),' and the
timing of responses to questionnaires. 6 Also, several significant
cases arose under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which
permits the International Trade Commission (ITC) to investigate
and potentially exclude goods that unfairly or unlawfully infringe
upon a patent or copyright.
This Article is divided into four parts, each designating a specific
category of cases. Part I focuses on the prominent number of
Part II addresses
antidumping and countervailing duty cases.
than other
specific
fact
more
much
are
which
classification cases,
cases in front of the Federal Circuit. Part III discusses procedural
cases, which may also overlap with the antidumping topic. Part IV
addresses intellectual property cases under section 337. This Article
focuses on the significant precedential cases, while excluding nonprecedential and some narrow precedential cases. The Article briefly
concludes by describing the Federal Circuit's pattern of deference to
the ITC and Commerce.
I.

ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES

Antidumping duties are fees that the United States imposes on
"foreign merchandise ... sold in the United States at less than its fair

2. Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v. United States, 809 F.3d 626, 628 (Fed. Cir.
2015); see infra notes 195-215 and accompanying text.
3. Schaeffler Grp. USA, Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 1354, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Pat Huval Rest. & Oyster Bar, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 785 F.3d 638, 639
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Giorgio Foods, Inc. v. United States, 785 F.3d 595, 597 (Fed. Cir.
2015); see infra notes 83, 98 and accompanying text.
4. JBF RAK LLC v. United States, 790 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see infra
note 35 and accompanying text.

5. Int'l Custom Prods. v. United States, 791 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see
infra note 108 and accompanying text.

6. Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co. v. United States, 777 F.3d 1343, 1346-47
(Fed. Cir. 2015); see infra note 162 and accompanying text.
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value."' Countervailing duties are placed on goods that benefit from
subsidies that foreign governments provide. 8 Commerce investigates
and determines whether foreign producers have sold or are likely to
sell products or goods at less than fair value in the case of dumping
or whether the government has provided a subsidy in the case of
countervailing.' The ITC continues the investigation by assessing
whether the imported goods are causing or threatening to cause
material injury to a domestic industry in the United States."o "Ifboth
inquiries are answered in the affirmative, Commerce issues the
relevant antidumping and countervailing duty orders.""
The antidumping or countervailing duty investigation process
typically begins with a request filed by a domestic party. That initial
petition will define the scope of the alleged dumping or subsidy,
which will limit the extent of the investigation.
Before the
investigation begins, Commerce must ensure that the petition was
filed on behalf of the relevant domestic industry." Numerically,
this means that the petition is supported by producers who
"account for at least [twenty-five] percent of the total production
of the domestic like product.""
The first antidumping case of the 2015 term before the Federal
Circuit addressed the scope of an antidumping order ("Order")
issued against Chinese manufacturers of certain aluminum
extrusions." An investigation began into these extrusions in 2010
and concluded with an antidumping order issued on May 26, 2011."
In October 2012, Walters & Wolf, Bagatelos Architectural Glass
Systems, Inc., and Architectural Glass and Aluminum Company
"submitted an amended scope request to Commerce pursuant to 19
C.F.R. § 351.225(c) (2012)," seeking to include curtain walls within

7. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (2012).
8. Id. § 1671 (a) (1).
9. Id. §§ 1671 (a)(1), 1673(1).
10. Id. §§ 1671d(b) (1), 1673d(b) (1).
11. Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c) (1) (A) (ii), (c) (2).
13. Id. § 1673a(c) (4) (A) (i).
14. Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng'g Co. v. United States, 776 F.3d
1351, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
15. See Aluminum Extrusions from the People's Republic of China:
Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions
from the People's Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg.
30,653 (May 26, 2011).
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the scope of the Order.' 6
The request sought to include the
following categories of components in that Order:
(i) an aluminum extruded frame, which includes anchors, overlays,
and other devices that attach the unit to the cement structure and
adjoining units; (ii) infill material; and (iii) hardware to attach the
curtain wall parts to the building, as well as to adjoining units,
including fasteners, elastomeric lineal gaskets, anchor assemblies
and components, clips, screws, nuts and bolts, steel embeds, splices
to adjoin units, sealants used between the frames, infill material,
and aluminum extrusion trim to physically attach the suspending
curtain wall to the building structure.17
Yuanda challenged the amended scope request and Commerce
reviewed the request, finding curtain wall units to be within the scope
of the Order." Yuanda challenged the final scope order at the CIT
and the CIT affirmed.'" The standard of review that the Federal
Circuit and the CIT applied was whether Commerce's decision was
"supported by substantial evidence and [wa]s otherwise in accordance
with law."o In its discussion, the Federal Circuit emphasized the
difficulty that parties have in overturning Commerce's decision,
referring to the high degree of deference they are afforded.'
When conducting a scope order review, Commerce is bound by 19
C.F.R. section 351.225(k) (1) and (k) (2). These regulations require
Commerce to assess the language of the original scope order, the
items described in the petition, and prior determinations by
Commerce and the ITC." In the event that this determination is not
dispositive, Commerce moves on to an analysis of the Diversified
Products Criteria.
Here, Commerce must assess whether the
proposed items are within the scope of the order by evaluating five
criteria: (1) "physical characteristics;" (2) "expectations of ultimate
purchasers;" (3) "ultimate use;" (4) "channels of trade in which the
product is sold;" and (5) manner of advertising and display.24

16. Shenyang Yuanda, 776 F.3d at 1353.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1352-53; Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng'g Co., v. United
States, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1294 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2014).
20. Shenyang Yuanda, 776 F.3d at 1354 (citing Glob. Commodity Grp. LLC v.
United States, 709 F.3d 1134, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
21. Id.

22. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k) (1) (2015).
23. Id. § 351.225(k) (2).
24. Id.
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Yuanda argued that the aluminum extrusions that were discussed
in the scope request appeared to be part of the scope of the original
scope order, but only when imported as part of curtain wall units, not
as separate items.2 ' The Federal Circuit disagreed and found that the
plain language of the order was clear and left no room for Yuanda's
interpretation.2 ' Additionally, Commerce relied on the test set forth
in subsection (k) (1) in making its assessment, finding no need to
look into the specific elements of the items in the expanded scope
order.2' The Federal Circuit found that decision appropriate and
affirmed the holding of the CIT.2
As part of the antidumping statute, affected parties are permitted
to request a review by Commerce of an order issued against them. 29

This administrative review process may result in a modified order or
the sustainment of the existing order. In JBF RAK LLC v. United
States," the order in question was a 2011 antidumping order on
polyurethane terephthalate (PET) film from the United Arab
Emirates." JBF immediately requested an administrative review of
this order.12 Prior to Commerce's issuance of preliminary results in
this investigation, another case was filed against JBF alleging
"targeted dumping," which selects individual manufacturers whose
merchandise differs significantly from that of other manufacturers
and thus should not be compared for purposes of assessing the value
of the alleged loss. 33 Commerce assigned JBF a targeted dumping
margin of 9.80% andJBF appealed to the CIT.34
The key issue in the JBF case was whether Commerce should have
applied the "average-transaction" formula for determining the
dumping margin rather than the more common "average-average"

25. Shenyang Yuanda, 776 F.3d at 1355-56.
26. Id. at 1357.
27. Id. at 1353-54.
28. Id. at 1359.
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (2012).
30. 790 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
31. Id. at 1360; Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from the
United Arab Emirates: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review;
2010-2011, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,700 (May 21, 2013).
32. JFB RAC LLC, 790 F.3d at 1361; Initiation of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and Request for Revocation in Part, 76
Fed. Reg. 82,268 (Dec. 30, 2011).
33. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing
19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d) (1) (B) (2012)).
34. Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from the United Arab Emirates:
Final Results ofAntidumping Duty Administrative Review, 78 Fed. Reg. at 29,701.
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formula." These formulae emanate from federal regulations, which
describe three methods for determining value:
(1) average-to-average: "a comparison of the weighted average of
the normal values with the weighted average of the export prices
(and constructed export prices) for comparable merchandise;" (2)
transaction-to-transaction: "a comparison of the normal values of
individual transactions with the export prices (or constructed
export prices) of individual transactions for comparable
merchandise;" and (3) average-to-transaction: "a comparison of
the weighted average of the normal values to the export prices (or
constructed export prices) of individual transactions for
comparable merchandise. 36
In this instance, JBF argued that Commerce did not have the
authority to apply these methodologies in an administrative review,
but only in an investigation.3 ' The statute discusses investigations but
does not discuss administrative reviews, thereby leaving a gap in
In these cases, Commerce may use its
which a case like this falls.
discretion to fill those gaps so long as its approach is reasonable.
In JBF, the Federal Circuit concluded that the application of a
targeted dumping methodology during the administrative review
process was reasonable.
In Downhole Pipe & Equipment, L.P., v. United States," the Federal
Circuit addressed whether Commerce can include goods in an
investigation that are already being investigated under a different
investigation.42 In the first iteration of this case in 2012, the CIT
concluded and the Federal Circuit agreed that Commerce has
statutory authority to determine which goods will be included in its
investigation.
The good in question in this case is known as "green
tube," which is the element that results from the first step in the
manufacture of a drilling tube.4

35. JBFRAK, LLC, 790 F.3d at 1362.
36. Id. at 1364 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(b) (1)-(3) (2015)).
37. Id. at 1362.
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1 (d) (1) (B).
39. JBFRAK LLC, 790 F.3d at 1364 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
40. Id.
41. 776 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
42. Id. at 1375.
43. Downhole Pipe & Equip., L.P. v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 131819 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2012).
44. Downhole Pipe, 776 F.3d at 1371.
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To support its argument, Downhole Pipe contended that
Commerce should reconsider whether there was sufficient industry
support to initiate an investigation in the first place." However, the
Federal Circuit reiterated that this is not something that Commerce
has the legal authority to do:
"[a]fter [Commerce] makes a
determination with respect to initiating an investigation, the
determination
regarding
industry support shall
not be
reconsidered.""
The Federal Circuit concluded that Downhole
Pipe's argument failed on the basis of this statutory requirement.
In a similarly creative case later in 2015, Apex Exports sought to
have its antidumping duties deducted from the calculation of its
export price for purposes of calculating its dumping margin." They
first brought this claim to Commerce and the CIT in 2013, when it
was initially denied." The Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee
("Ad Hoc") appealed that decision to the Federal Circuit.5 o
To determine the antidumping duty to be imposed on an exporter,
Commerce applies the export price (EP) methodology, setting the EP
as the first sale price to an unaffiliated, arms-length domestic buyer in
the United States. Thereafter, Commerce determines the normal or
fair value of the merchandise from the merchandise sales price in the
exporter's country. When Commerce identifies a normal or fair
value greater than the EP and injury or threat of injury to U.S.
industry, it applies an antidumping duty margin equivalent to the
difference in assessed values.
Title 19 of the U.S. Code provides several allowances to more
precisely calculate the value of the subject merchandise.
Specifically, it says:
[t]he price used to establish export price . . shall be . . reduced
by . . the amount, if any, included in such price, attributable to
any additional costs, charges, or expenses, and United States
import duties, which are incident to bringing the subject
merchandise from the original place of shipment in the exporting
country to the place of delivery in the United States. 5 1

45. Id. at 1375-76.
46. Id. at 1374 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c) (4) (E) (2012)).
47. Id. at 1377. The Federal Circuit went on to discuss other factors that were
not included here, ultimately upholding the finding of the CIT. Id. at 1381.
48. Apex Exps. v. United States, No. 11-00291, 2013 WL 6978901, at *1 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Dec. 31, 2013).
49. Id. at *10.
50. Apex Exps. v. United States, 777 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c).
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Among other things, the statute allows for the deduction of freight
costs, U.S. customs duties, and port charges."
When calculating the dumping margin, Commerce will attempt to
find comparable sales in the exporter's home market to compare to
the unaffiliated buyer sales in the U.S. market, taking into account all
associated costs in each of those markets." In this case, Commerce
did not find sufficient exporter market sales to calculate a proper
normal value.5 4 In such cases, Commerce will select a similar market
in which the exporter has sufficient sales." In the case of Apex, that
market was the United Kingdom.
Apex sold its merchandise to buyers in the United Kingdom under
cost and freight contracts, which required Apex only to land its goods
at a designated port in the UK" On the contrary, Apex's sales to
buyers in the United States were delivery-duty-paid (DDP) contracts,
whereby Apex served as both exporter and importer, including
payment of customs fees upon arrival." Ad Hoc argued that this
difference in contract type should merit a different EP calculation.
Specifically, Ad Hoc argued Apex should deduct its dumping duty from
its EP, in effect expanding the dumping margin and subsequent duty.o
Whether antidumping duties should be included when calculating
EP is an issue that has been raised before.61 In that case, the CIT
found Title 19 to be ambiguous with respect to how "import duties"
are defined." However, in Apex, Ad Hoc asked whether antidumping

52. Id.; Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from India: Preliminary Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, Partial Rescission of Review, and
Preliminary No Shipment Determination, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,025, 12,028 (Mar. 4, 2011).
53. Apex Exps., 777 F.3d at 1374-75.
54. Id. at 1375.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1376.
58. Id.
59. Id. The Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee was party to a second case
in front of the Federal Circuit in 2015 in which they defended against a claim by
Hilltop International seeking a separate dumping duty rate for imports of certain
frozen warmwater shrimp. Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States,
802 F.3d 1339, 1341-48 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
60. Apex Exps., 777 F.3d at 1376.
61. See Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d 1355, 1359-61 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (finding that the statute describing import duties is ambiguous and allowing
Commerce to exclude safeguard duties from its calculation); see also 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677a(c) (2) (2012) (establishing a formula to calculate export price ("EP") that
does not expressly include instructions for the treatment of antidumping duties).
62. Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d at 1359-60.
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duties constitute "additional costs, charges, or expenses.""3 The CIT
again found the statute ambiguous and deferred to Commerce's
interpretation that such duties were excluded from the EP calculation.'
On appeal, the Federal Circuit again reiterated the CIT determination
that the statute is ambiguous and that Commerce is owed deference in
its interpretation, and that its interpretation is not unreasonable."
Ambiguity was also at issue in a countervailing duty case focused on
China in 2007 that continued into the 2015 Federal Circuit term. In
GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States," the Federal Circuit
addressed whether Commerce may apply countervailing duties
against non-market economy countries.
In the first iteration of this
case, GPX I, the Federal Circuit determined that whereas Commerce
may apply both antidumping and countervailing duties against
market economy exporters, they may not levy countervailing duties
against exporters from non-market economies because of the
difficulty in determining the extent of government subsidies.' The
Federal Circuit based its conclusion in GPX on the 1986 Georgetown
Steel Corp. v. United States precedent.69
In 2006, Commerce began to consider whether to apply
countervailing duties on subject exports from China, a non-market
economy.70 The Georgetown Steel case mentioned above gave rise to
the Georgetown Memo, issued by Commerce in 2007 to announce a new
policy allowing countervailing duties to be assessed against Chinese

63. Apex Exps., 777 F.3d at 1377.
64. Apex Exps. v. United States, No. 11-00291, 2013 WL 6978901, at *6 (Ct. Int'l
Trade Dec. 31, 2013) (citing Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d at 1359-60).
65. Apex Exps., 777 F.3d at 1378, 1381.
66. GPX IV, 780 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
67. Id. at 1140; see infra note 167 (explaining non-market economies).
68. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States (GPX 1), 666 F.3d 732, 745 (Fed. Cir.
2011), rehggranted, (GPX 11), 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and superseded by statute,
Application of Countervailing Duty Provisions to Nonmarket Economy Countries,
Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265, as recognized in Guangdong Wireking Housewares
& Hardware Co. v. United States, 745 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
69. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1314-18 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (holding that Commerce cannot levy countervailing duties against exporters
from non-market countries because Congress did not intend for the countervailing
duty law to apply in that situation, as evidence by the fact that Congress enacted
alternative statutes to address the problem of exports from non-market countries).
70. See Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Coated Free
Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, Indonesia, and the Republic of
Korea, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,546, 68,549 (Nov. 27, 2006) (noting that Georgetown Steel
discretion is available to Commerce when deciding to investigate allegations of
Chinese subsidies on certain paper products).
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goods.7 1 This position was overruled in 2011 in the GPXIcase, wherein
the Federal Circuit held that congressional intent superseded
Commerce's discretion as expounded in Georgetown SteeL 72
Three months later, Congress enacted new legislation overturning
the GPX I decision and allowing Commerce to impose countervailing
duties on non-market economy countries both retroactively and
prospectively.7 ' GPX challenged the new law and contended that it
was unconstitutional because it violated the ex post facto clause, as
well as the Fifth Amendment's due process and equal protection
provisions." The CIT disagreed and upheld the constitutionality of
the statute, though it remanded application of countervailing duties
against GPX back to Commerce for further factual determination.7 1
With respect to the due process challenge in GPX III, the Federal
Circuit found no violation under the new law." It noted that, in
assessing due process violations, "the strong deference accorded
legislation in the field of national economic policy is no less
applicable when that legislation is applied retroactively."" For the
statute at issue in GPX III, the court found that it was "rationally
related to legitimate government interests" and thus was upheld."

71. E.g., GPX I, 666 F.3d at 735-36 (describing the rationale in the Georgetown
Memo for treating China differently than "Soviet-style economies" to be that the
differences in China's economy "enabled Commerce to calculate whether the
government subsidized specific goods").
72. See id. at 745 (finding that by "amending and reenacting the trade laws in
1988 and 1994," Congress demonstrated its intent that countervailing duties should
not be applied to non-market economy countries).
73. See Act of Mar. 13, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 (2012) (codified at
19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(f), 1677f-1(f) (2012)) (stating that countervailing duties must be
imposed on relevant goods from non-market economies unless subsidies cannot be
identified or measured).
74. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States (GPX 11), 893 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1305
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2013).
75. Id. at 1334. Note that while awaiting- continuation of the appellate process in
this case, the Federal Circuit decided another case challenging the ex post facto
nature of the new law. See Guangdong Wireking Housewares & Hardware Co. v.
United States, 745 F.3d 1194, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding that the law did not
violate the ex post facto clause for the same reason as in GPX III-because it was
remedial in nature rather than punitive).
76. GPX III, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 1311, 1316 (noting that GPX "failed to
demonstrate that the government did not have a rational basis in enacting" the
statute, or that the statute "upended a vested right").
77. Id. at 1311 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S.
717, 729 (1984)).
78. Id. at 1334.
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An antidumping duty can be beneficial to U.S. domestic producers
in several ways. The most obvious benefit is protection against unfair
imports by raising the cost of those imports to levels equivalent to the
costs of the domestic producers.79
But a second benefit was
established by former Senator Robert Byrd with the passage of the
"Byrd Amendment." The Byrd Amendment-which was later found
to be in violation of U.S. obligations at the WTO and subsequently
repealed by Congress"-incentivized the pursuit of antidumping
actions by providing that antidumping duties collected by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) would be distributed directly
to complaining petitioners in the United States.81
Decided in 2015, Giorgio Foods, Inc. v. United States 2 concluded a
long-standing dispute over whether Giorgio was eligible to receive
payouts under the Byrd Amendment when it failed to expressly
support the relevant antidumping petition." In 1998, the ITC
initiated an investigation into certain preserved mushrooms from
Chile, India, Indonesia, and China.8 4 Questionnaires were issued by
the ITC to the domestic industry, including Giorgio, asking
participants to indicate by checkbox whether they supported,
opposed, or took no opinion on the petition.8 ' Giorgio "did not
check any of the boxes" but instead wrote, "[w] e take no position on
Chile, China and Indonesia. We oppose the petition against India.""
Commerce then initiated an investigation, which concluded that
dumping had occurred from those countries, leading to the
establishment of antidumping duties.

79. See, e.g., id. at 1310 (explaining that antidumping remedies require
"detailed calculations ...
to establish a duty rate that reasonably offsets the
effects of foreign subsidies").
80. See Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387,
§ 1003, 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-73 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(a)-(d) (2000)),
repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601 (a), 120 Stat. 4,
154 (2006); Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000, pt. II 2, pt. XI 1 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS217/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16,
2003) (concluding that the Byrd Amendment violated U.S. trade obligations under
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements).
81. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387,
§ 1003, 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-73.
82. 785 F.3d 595 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
83. Id. at 597-99.
84. Id. at 597.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 597-98.
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While in effect, the Byrd Amendment required CBP to collect and
distribute duties to "affected domestic producers."" To qualify as
such, an entity had to prove that it "was a petitioner or interested
party in support of the petition with respect to which an antidumping
duty order . . has been entered."" Giorgio petitioned the ITC to be
included on the list of affected petitioners, but was denied based on a
90
lack of support indicated on its questionnaire.
Giorgio initially brought suit in 2003, but its case was stayed
pending the outcome of similar challenges.9 In particular, SKF USA,
Inc. v. US. Customs & Border Protection9 2 held that the support
requirement for eligible petitioners did not violate the First
Amendment." After resolution of SKF USA, Giorgio moved to amend
its complaint in 2011 arguing that the ITC failed to recognize that
Giorgio expressed its support in ways other than checking the box on
the questionnaire-such as by providing confidential commercial
information to petitions and contributing to the legal fees of the
petitioners." The CIT dismissed Giorgio's motion to amend for
"fail [ure] to state a claim in light of" the SKYF USA case."
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its prior statements that
"a producer who never indicates support for the petition by letter or
through questionnaire response cannot be an affected domestic
producer because a producer's bare statement that it was a supporter
is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition to obtain affected

88. Id. at 598 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(a) (2000) (repealed 2006)).
89. Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(b)(1)(A) (2000) (repealed 2006)).
90. Id. at 599.
91. See id. (noting that the cases shared issues regarding First Amendment
challenges to the Byrd Amendment).
92. 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
93. Id. at 1359-60; see also GiorgioFoods, Inc., 785 F.3d at 599 (reasoning that the
support requirement rewarded parties "who assist in trade law enforcement[,]" and
therefore advanced a substantial government interest). Observe that two cases
worthy of note were heard during the 2015 Federal Circuit term that used similar
reasoning in relation to due process claims. Both Schaefjler Group USA, Inc. v. United
States and Pat Huval Restaurant & Oyster Bar, Inc. v. International Trade Commission
dismissed due process challenges to the Byrd Amendment's retroactive application
under a rational basis review. See Schaeffler Grp. USA, Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d
1354, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Pat Huval Rest. & Oyster Bar, Inc. v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 785 F.3d 638, 644, 647 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
94. See Giorgio Foods, Inc., 785 F.3d at 599 (acknowledging that all of the support
given was confidential, rather than public).
95. Id. The ITC also dismissed all of Giorgio's claims. Id.
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domestic producer status."" The Federal Circuit found here that
Giorgio failed to meet the statutory requirement set forth in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675c(d) (1) because "indicating support by letter or through
questionnaire response" was not enough.9 7 Therefore, the company did
not qualify for any distribution under the Byrd Amendment."
The liquidation process described in Giorgio is an important part of
the legal process a party must go through when challenging an
antidumping order. Once imports arrive at a port of entry, an
importer or customs broker must file an entry form and, assuming
there were no violations found upon inspection, the goods are
released." When the importer retrieves the goods, he or she must
pay estimated duties on those entries "within [ten] working days."10
However, CBP retains the right to adjust the duties based upon
reclassification of the goods for approximately 314 days following
entry."o' If CBP fails to liquidate within one year of the entry, the
goods are automatically liquidated,102 unless the time period is
extended.1 3
Liquidation is significant because it triggers the
statutory period of 180 days in which an importer may challenge the
final duty determination. 0 4
After that period, the duty
determination is considered final.
Once the recalculation is
complete, the entries are "liquidated" and the importer is given 180
days to protest the liquidated amount.10 After this protest period,
the duties are considered final and cannot be challenged.'

96. Id. at 601 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashley Furniture
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 734 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
97. See id.
98. See id. at 602 (holding that neither opposition to a petition nor "the lack of a
position" satisfies Byrd Amendment's support requirement).
99. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECION, IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES: A GUIDE
FOR COMMfERCIAL IMPORTERS 11, 13 (2006)
[hereinafter GUIDE TO IMPORTING],

http://www.cbp.gov/sites/defaiult/files/documents/Importing%20into%20the%20U.S.pdf.
100. Id. at 13.
101. Letter from Dir., Office of Trade Compliance, to All Interested Parties (May
26,
1997),
http://apps.cbp.gov/csms/viewmssg.asp?Recid=15326&page=107
(notifying interested parties that "a 314 day no change liquidation cycle has replaced
our [ninety] day no change liquidation cycle").
102. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a) (1) (A) (2012).
103. Id. at 1504(b).
104. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c) (3).
105. GUIDE TO IMPORTING, supra note 99, at 82.
106. Id.
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7
The question in InternationalCustom Products, Inc. v. United States`o
was whether the protest process must be completed before the CIT
can exercise jurisdiction over a challenge to assessed duties, and the
constitutionality of the pre-payment requirement for filing a
protest. 0 8 The first in a series of challenges brought by International
Custom Products ("ICP") was filed in 2005 after it suffered a
09
liquidated tariff increase of 2400% on its imports of "white sauce."
CBP failed to follow the required notice and comment process before
re-classifying the sauce.o However, rather than protest, ICP filed
directly with the CIT invoking jurisdiction under § 1581 (i), a section
known as "residual jurisdiction."'
Residual jurisdiction might be applied where remedies under other
2
In the 2005
sections of the statute are "manifestly inadequate.""
case and resulting appeal, the issue whether the consequences of
reclassification when ICP was already on the "brink of bankruptcy"
fell within that standard."' The CIT upheld its jurisdiction and
ultimately ruled that CBP violated "the notice and comment procedures
of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c)."" The Federal Circuit reversed that decision in
2006, finding that "mere allegations of financial harm ... do not make
5
the remedy established by Congress manifestly inadequate.""
ICP continued to fight the customs ruling that reclassified white
sauce as dairy spreads and, in 2014, they were successful in having the
ruling revoked."' However, ICP was unable to avail itself of the relief
provided for by the 2014 decision for thirteen protested entry

107. 791 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-960 (Jan. 29,
2016).
108. See id. at 1335, 1338 (noting that the constitutional arguments underlie the
statutory arguments as well, making their resolution key to deciding the case).
109. See id. at 1332-33.
110. Id.at1333.
111. Id. at 1333. Section 1581 (i) captures international trade cases that fall outside the
jurisdictional elements of subsections (a)-(h). 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (2012).
112. See Int'l Custom Prods., Inc., 791 F.3d at 1333 (referencing use of the
"manifestly inadequate" standard by Court of International Trade (CIT) and Federal
Circuit in the 2005 case).
113. Id.; Int'l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1321-22 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2005), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 467 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that
the financial considerations were sufficient to grant the court residual jurisdiction).
114. Int'l Custom Prods., Inc., 791 F.3d at 1333.
115. See id. (rejecting the financial harm argument as an attempt to "circumvent"
statutory requirements, and determining that ICP had to protest and pay the duty
before it could invoke ITC jurisdiction).
116. See id.
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liquidations because of procedural issues."' CBP established liability
for ICP of roughly $28 million for those liquidated entries, which ICP
did not pay before filing suit because it "remained on the 'brink of
bankruptcy.""" Those entries were at issue in the ICP case decided
this term. 1 '
The CIT was sympathetic to ICP's as-applied
constitutional challenge based on economic hardship, but ultimately
2
upheld the pre-payment requirement.o
1
At the Federal Circuit, the court addressed the constitutional
validity of the pre-payment requirement found in the CIT's
jurisdictional statute."' It concluded that the requirement is not a
violation of the due process clause, but rather is a conditional waiver
of the United States' sovereign immunity.1 22 The same logic could be
extracted from challenges related to taxation, which also require prepayment of penalties before immunity will be waived. 23
Additionally, the Federal Circuit found that ICP had no legitimate
due process claim because it had no property interest in a particular
classification or duty rate.12 1 It also found that engagement in
international trade was not a substantive due process right.' 2 ' Finally,
the Federal Circuit concluded, yet again, that the CIT cannot acquire
jurisdiction over a challenge to duties levied without first filing a

&

117. See id. at 1333-34 (relating details of the procedural history that precluded
those thirteen entries from having their protest suspended, and therefore becoming
final prior to resolution of the 2014 case).
118. Id. at 1334.
119. Id.
120. See id. (explaining that the CIT "recognized that the pre-payment
requirement 'seemed both harsh and unfair when applied [to ICP],"' but also noted
"that the pre-payment requirement 'ha[d] been a fixture of the customs laws' since
1845" (quoting Int'l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1338,
1343-44 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2013))).
121. See id. at 1335 (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a) (2012) serves as the statutory
basis for the pre-payment requirement).
122. See id. (explaining that the government can only be sued under
circumstances where it has expressly waived its sovereign immunity).
123. See id. at 1336 (discussing cases upholding a requirement to prepay taxes
before being able to file a refund suit); see also, e.g., United States v. Clintwood
Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 11 (2008) (holding that a taxpayer must pay his or
her taxes before bringing an action for refund).
124. Int'l Customs Prods., Inc., 791 F.3d at 1337.
125. See id. (noting that engaging in foreign commerce is not a "fundamental
right," and therefore not a "protectable interest" (quoting NEC Corp. v. United
States, 151 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Am. Ass'n of Exps. & Imps.-Textile
Apparel Grp. v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).
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protest and then seeking jurisdiction under § 1581 (a) .121 Without
payment of the duties, no protest can be filed, and without a protest
being filed, no challenge at the CIT can commence.
II. CLASSIFICATION CASES

Duty rates on imported goods are determined by, among other
27
things, the classification of those goods by CBP upon importation.
Classification is the process of identifying where in the U.S.
12
Harmonized Tariff Schedule (USHTS) a particular good falls. ' The
classification process is essential for importers because it will establish
the designation within the schedule for that good, which is directly
linked to the applicable tariff.' 2 In many cases, such as the first one in
our analysis, components of goods will be classified in a manner that
leads to residual effects upon finished goods-leading component
manufacturers in some instances to challenge a lower tariff rate
associated with a classification that affects its end-use customers.
In Best Key Textiles v. United States,'o a manufacturer of yarns made
with "polyester chips and metal nanopowders" and garments appealed
a series of pre-importation classification rulings regarding its yarns and a
garment called the "Johnny Collar" pullover.13 ' The yarn was initially
classified as "metalized yarn" by New York customs, but was reclassified to
2 Similarly,
"polyester yarn" after reconsideration by CBP Headquarters.'
the Johnny Collar pullover was first classified "as a pullover of man-made
non-metalized fibers," but upon review was reclassified under the
subheading for "men's shirts made of polyester."133
During the initial review, Best Key sought to have the Johnny Collar
pullover classified under HTSUS 6105.90.8030, which included men's
shirts made with "other textile materials" and which carried a duty
New York Customs conducted a
rate of 5.6% ad valorem.13 '
and found only "trace amounts of
pullovers
laboratory analysis of the

126. See id. at 1339 (noting concern that finding otherwise would allow "artful
pleading" to circumvent Congress's statutory scheme).
127. GuIDE TO IMPORTING, supra note 99, at 81.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 82 (describing potential consequences resulting from incorrect
classification).
130. 777 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
131. Id. at 1358.
132. See id. at 1358-59 (noting that the metalized yarn classification had a 13.2%
duty, while the polyester yarn classification had only an 8% duty rate).
133. See id. (resulting in a duty rate of thirty-two percent).
134. Id. at 1358.
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metal" in the fabric.135 Customs thus classified the pullovers under
heading HTSUS 6110.30.3053, for pullovers "of man-made nonmetalized fibers," based on the lab results and a "label that stated
'100% polyester."" 3 6

This heading carries a duty rate of thirty-two

percent ad valorem.'13
"Johnny Collar" ruling.

Best Key sought a reconsideration of the
13

CBP Headquarters reviewed the Yarn and "Johnny Collar" rulings
and, in 2013, "published notices of proposed revocation of both
rulings."'"3
CBP Headquarters reclassified Best Key's yarn as
polyester yarn under HTSUS 5402.47.90 after receiving two
comments in response to its notice. 14
As a result of the yarn
reclassification, CBP Headquarters also revoked the 'Johnny Collar"
ruling, but maintained the classification of the pullovers as polyester
under HTSUS 6110.30.30.1
Best Key challenged the Yarn Ruling Revocation before the CIT,
but did not challenge the Johnny Collar Revocation. 42 Even though
Best Key received a lower duty rate on its yarn through the revocation
issued by CBP Headquarters, it contended that the Yarn Ruling
Revocation caused them a loss of business in relation to the Johnny
Collar Revocation. 4 3 The CIT sustained the revocation ruling and
Best Key appealed to the Federal Circuit.'"
On appeal, the principal issue raised was whether the CIT had
jurisdiction to hear Best Key's challenge at all because Best Key does

&

&

135. Id.
136. See id. (alternately referencing the subsection as being "for men's shirts made
of polyester").
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1358-59; see Proposed Revocation of Ruling Letter & Proposed
Revocation of Treatment Relating to the Tariff Classification of a 'Johnny Collar"
Pullover Garment, 47-18 Cust. B. & Dec. 26, 28 (Apr. 24, 2013); Proposed Revocation
of Ruling Letter & Proposed Revocation of Treatment Relating to the Tariff
Classification of a Polyester Monofilament Yarn, 47-18 Cust. B. & Dec. 33, 35 (Apr.
24, 2013).
140. Best Key Textiles Co., 777 F.3d at 1359; see Customs Headquarters Ruling HQ
H202560, 2013 WL 7891683 (Sept. 17, 2013); Revocation of Ruling Letter
Revocation of Treatment Relating to the Tariff Classification of a Polyester
Monofilament Yarn, 47-41 Cust. B. & Dec. 20, 22 (Oct. 2, 2013).
141. Best Key Textiles Co., 777 F.3d at 1359; see Revocation of Ruling Letter
Revocation of Treatment Relating to the Tariff Classification of a "Johnny Collar"
Pullover Garment, 47-41 Cust. B. & Dec. 15, 17 (Oct. 2, 2013).
142. Best Key Textiles Co., 777 F.3d at 1359.
143. Id. at 1362.
144. Id. at 1359.
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not directly import its products, but rather sells the yarn to producers
14 5
In essence, the
who import finished garments made of the yarn.
behalf of its
on
defense
a
raising
was
Key
Best
that
CIT decided
146 The Federal Circuit determined
customers rather than for itself.
that the CIT has:
exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to review,
prior to the importation of the goods involved, a ruling issued by
the Secretary of the Treasury, or a refusal to issue or change such a
ruling, relating to classification, valuation, rate of duty, marking,
restricted merchandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel
repairs, or similar matters, but only if the party commencing the
civil action demonstrates to the court that he would be irreparably
harmed unless given an opportunity to obtain judicial review prior
to such importation. 147
The jurisdiction granted to the CIT under § 1581, as noted above,
requires some type of injury in order to sustain an action. The
Federal Circuit held that because Best Key was not suffering an injury
because it was not exporting its yarn, it could not sustain an action at
the CIT.1 48 The proper procedure would be for Best Key's customers
to import their textiles to the United States and, following
49
The Federal
liquidation, protest the classification of their goods.'
Circuit thus determined there was not proper jurisdiction in the case,
50
and it reversed and vacated the CIT holding.
At the other end of the classification spectrum are claims against
importers for damages due to misclassification. In United States v.
Nitek Electronics, Inc.,"' the importer entered gas meter swivels and
nuts used in pipe fitting.'"' CBP claimed that the entries were
misclassified and issued a notice that the importer would be charged
additional duties, with tentative culpability placed on the importer
53
due to gross negligence.

145. Id. at 1361-62.
146. Id. at 1361.
147. Id. at 1359-60 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) (2012)).
148. See id. at 1363 (noting further that to allow a cause of action to benefit
customers rather than the petitioner itself would create "a new cause of action under
§ 1581(i)," which is prohibited).
149. Id. at 1362-63.
150. Id. at 1363.
151. 806 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
152. Id. at 1377.
153. See id. (noting that CBP asserted that Nitek had submitted "material[ly] false
statements and documents").
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The case was referred to the U.S. Department of Justice to pursue
the penalty claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1582.154 However,
the United States pursued the claim under a standard of negligence
rather than gross negligence.'1 5 The CIT dismissed the penalty claim
for negligence because it was under a different standard than what
had been referred to by CBP and thus "the [g]overnment had failed
to exhaust all administrative remedies."1 55 In upholding the CIT's
reasoning, the Federal Circuit explained that "[t]he pre-penalty
notice must 'specify all laws and regulations allegedly violated' and
'state whether the alleged violation occurred as a result of fraud,
gross negligence, or negligence.'"'57 Further, § 1592(e) allows the
United States to bring a claim to collect penalties established by
CBP.'" And because fraud, negligence, and gross negligence differ,
the United States' attempt to change the cause of action in effect
created a new penalty.' The Federal Circuit therefore agreed with
the CIT that only penalties issued by CBP can be sought by the
United States under § 1592(e)."o
III. PROCEDURAL CASES
The rules of procedure for international trade cases, as discussed
above with respect to antidumping and countervailing investigations,
are rigid. And though Commerce possesses discretionary authority in
certain cases to waive strict enforcement of some procedural provisions,
a petitioner would be wise not to abuse this discretion.'"' This was the
case for Dongtai Peak Honey Industry Company ("Dongtai").1 6 2

154. See id. at 1378 (recognizing that Nitek opposed the claim of gross negligence
and asserted that "it had not acted with wanton disregard for the law").
155. Id.
156. See id. at 1378 (indicating that the CIT found that "the Government had
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies by not having [CBP] demand a penalty
based on negligence").
157. Id. at 1379 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1592(b) (1) (A) (iii), (v) (2012)).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 1379-80 (describing the burden of proof associated with each "level
of culpability").
160. See id. at 1382.
161. "Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances[,]
'the administrative agencies "should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure
and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their
multitudinous duties.""' Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965)).
162. Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co. v. United States, 777 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
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Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on honey imported
from China in 2001.'16 As part of its annual administrative review
process, Commerce named Dongtai as one of the subject producers
under the order for the period December 1, 2010 through November
30, 2011.1' During its administrative review process, Commerce
typically solicits information from respondents under the relevant
order about their exports and costs, among other things." This is
done in the form of questionnaires issued directly to the respondents
with deadlines by which those respondents must reply.166
During its 2012 review cycle, Commerce issued a questionnaire to
Dongtai soliciting information about its non-market economy16 1
sales." The deadline for Dongtai to respond to certain sections of
this questionnaire was April 8, 2012.169 Six minutes prior to the
submission deadline, Dongtai submitted a request for a time
extension.' 7 0 Commerce granted this request, noting in its letter
that, "[t]o ensure that [Commerce] is fully able to consider
requests of this nature, we advise Dongtai Peak to plan accordingly
and file any future extension requests as soon as it suspects
additional time may be necessary."171
Subsequently, Dongtai failed to meet the deadline to respond to a
separate section of the questionnaire."' Dongtai filed a request for
extension two days after the deadline, claiming a variety of
justifications for the late response, including a Chinese holiday and

163. Honey from the People's Republic of China, 66 Fed. Reg. 63,670 (Dec. 10, 2001).
164. Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews
and Requests for Revocation in Part, 77 Fed. Reg. 4759 (Jan. 31, 2012).
165. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
HANDBOOK 11-7 to 11-8 (14th ed. 2015), https://www.usitc.gov/trade-remedy/
documents/handbook.pdf.
166. DongtaiPeak, 777 F.3d at 1346.
167. "A 'nonmarket economy country' is 'any foreign country that [Commerce]
determines does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so
that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the
merchandise."' Dongtai Peak, 777 F.3d at 1350 n.1 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (A)
(2012)). Commerce considers China be a non-market economy and because of this,
it "generally considers information on sales in China and financial information obtained
from Chinese producers to be unreliable for determining, under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a),
the normal value of the subject merchandise." Id. (quoting Shanghai Foreign Trade
Enters. Co. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1341 (CL Int'l Trade 2004)).
168. See id. at 1346.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1346-47.
172. Id. at 1347.
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trouble with the translation.1 7 ' The Honey Producers Association
petitioned Commerce to deny the extension request, and Dongtai
reiterated its justification to grant the request.1 74 Noting that it had
already placed Dongtai on notice that late requests would not be
considered, Commerce denied Dongtai's request.17 ' Dongtai petitioned
for reconsideration, but Commerce rejected its request and ultimately
removed its untimely questionnaire responses from the record."'
Accordingly, because the record lacked sufficient data to grant
Dongtai a separate rate apart of the Order, Dongtai was subjected to
the full duty.' 7 On November 26, 2012, Commerce issued its "Final
Results," affirming the entirety of its "PreliminaryResults."17 Dongtai
challenged this decision at the CIT in 2014, and, following the denial
of its challenge in 2014, Dongtai appealed to the Federal Circuit.' 7 9
As noted at the outset of this Part, Commerce has some procedural
discretion in considering requests by parties subject to antidumping
or countervailing duty orders. With respect to timely responses to
requests for information, Commerce maintains discretion to extend
the time allotted for filing such responses.s0 However, Commerce
also maintains the authority to seek strict compliance with its
deadlines."' The court will generally defer to the discretion of the
agency in making these determinations.'
In this case, the Federal
Circuit found that Dongtai was given additional time to file its
response once, and that Commerce was acting within its authority
when denying the second such request.'
In another case arising out of imports from China and Vietnam in
this instance, a procedural question arose with respect to counting
votes among commissioners of the ITC. As discussed above, the ITC

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citing Honey From the People's Republic of China, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,699,
46,701-02 (Aug. 6, 2012)).
178. Id. at 1348.
179. Id.; Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co. v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 2d 1234,
1245 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2014).
180. 19 C.F.R. § 351.302(b) (2015).
181. "In order for Commerce to fulfill its mandate to administer the antidumping
duty law, including its obligation to calculate accurate dumping margins, it must be
permitted to enforce the time frame provided in its regulations." Yantai Timken Co.
v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1371 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2007).
182. DongtaiPeak, 777 F.3d at 1351.
183. Id. at 1350-51.
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is responsible for determining injury or threat of injury to domestic
industry.' 84 The ITC consists of six commissioners who vote in these
determinations." A majority vote prevails and, in the case of a tie,
an affirmative determination results. 186
Siemens Energy, Inc. v. United States'87 addresses the unique issue of
an evenly divided vote amongst the ITC commissioners where two
found material injury, one found threat of material injury, and three
found neither type of injury.'" The ITC concluded that an evenly
divided vote, regardless of whether it was for threat or actual injury, still
The CIT upheld this
results in an affirmative determination.8 8
decision'" and, following the same procedure, the Federal Circuit
determined whether the ITC's decision was "unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.""'
For purposes of assessing whether the ITC decision was based
upon substantial evidence, the Federal Circuit looks to the relevant
statute, which states:
For the purpose of applying this paragraph when the issue before
the Commission is to determine whether there is-(A) material
injury to an industry in the United States, (B) threat of material injury
to such an industry, or (C) material retardation of the establishment
of an industry in the United States, by reason of imports of the
merchandise, an affirmative vote on any of the issues shall be treated
92
as a vote that the determination should be affirmative.

Given that the statute appears to consider the possibility that
commissioners may not all vote for the same type of affirmative
finding, the Federal Circuit determined that it was reasonable for the
ITC to interpret such a vote as within the automatic affirmation of

184. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11) (2012).
185. Id. § 1330(a); see, e.g., MBL (USA) Corp. v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 202,
205-08 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992) (explaining the procedure when the voting
commissioners are evenly divided and where there is no majority result).
186. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11).
187. 806 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
188. Id. at 1369.
189. See Siemens Energy, Inc. v. United States, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1322 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2014), affd, 806 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (describing the process the
ITC used to reach its final determination that domestic industry would be harmed by
the importation of Chinese wind towers).
190. Id. at 1345.
191. Siemens Energy, Inc., 806 F.3d at 1369 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (1) (B) (i))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
192. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11).
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the statute.' 9 3
In addition, because Commerce only levied
prospective duties against the importer, which typically occurs when
only threat of material injury is found, the Federal Circuit concluded
that its actions were reasonable.

94

The clarification of rules governing the investigation of dumping
cases continued in Diamond Sawblades Manufacturer's Coalition v.
Hyosung D & P Co.'
Diamond Sawblades addressed the former
practice of "zeroing."" 6 In a dumping investigation that found a
subject manufacturer's sales above fair market value, the Commission
would treat those sales as zero, thereby providing no offset to sales
made at less than fair value. '
In effect, this makes it much more
likely that Commerce can sustain a claim of dumping."' In 2005, the
European Communities challenged the practice of zeroing at the
WTO. " The WTO determined that the United States and its zeroing
practice violated the country's obligations under the WTO
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.200

Due to the WTO decision, Commerce proposed a change to its
dumping investigation policy by eliminating the practice of
zeroing. 1 In the proposed rule, Commerce stated that the new
policy would take effect upon publication of the final rule.20 2 When
Commerce promulgated the final rule on December 27, 2006, it
stated that the new rule would only apply to pending and future cases

193. Siemens Energy, Inc., 806 F.3d at 1369 ("The ITC statute thus foresaw possible
factual variations, and Congress established that a tie vote produces an affirmative
determination of injury.").
194. Id. at 1372-73.
195. 809 F.3d 626 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
196. Id. at 628.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Advanced Tech. & Materials Co. v. United States, 33 I.T.R.D. 1874 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2011).
200. Id.; Antidumping Proceedings:
Calculation of the Weighted Average
Dumping Margin During an Antidumping Duty Investigation, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,189
(Mar. 6, 2006).
201. Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted Average Dumping
Margin During an Antidumping Duty Investigation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 11,189.
202. Id.
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as of the effective date, which was January 16, 2007.203

Later,

Commerce changed the effective date to February 22, 2007.204
In June 2005, several Chinese and Korean exporters of diamond
sawblades came under investigation for dumping based upon
allegations by Diamond Sawblades Manufacturers.
In that
investigation, the ITC found no material injury and thus dismissed
the petition.206 In July 2006, the same petitioner appealed that
decision to the CIT, which remanded the case to the ITC for
reconsideration in February 2008, long after the new Commerce policy
on zeroing had taken effect.207

The ITC, applying the then defunct

zeroing policy, found threatened material injury and issued an
antidumping order, which the CIT and Federal Circuit affirmed.20 8
The question in this case was whether Commerce was ambiguous
enough in its effective date for the new no-zeroing policy to allow a
reasonable interpretation of the ambiguity to cover this investigation
at the time the investigation initially concluded.2 " The court found
that the new rule was ambiguous and appeared to take effect only in
February 2007.210 It also concluded that Commerce finished the
investigation of this dumping action in May 2006.1 Consequentially,
the court held that the conclusion that the case was ongoing at the
time the new rule took effect was reasonable. 1
When the CIT
remanded the case to the ITC, the ITC had only ministerial duties to
perform in making its determination.21' As such, there would be no
reason to apply a new policy to an already completed investigation. 214
The Federal Circuit upheld the CIT finding that application of the
no-zeroing policy was not required in this case. 1
203. Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal. v. United States, 809 F.3d 626,628 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
204. Id. at 628-29; Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the WeightedAverage Dumping Margins in Antidumping Investigations; Change in Effective Date
of Final Modification, 72 Fed. Reg. 3783 (Jan. 26, 2007).
205. Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigations: Diamond Sawblades and Parts
Thereof from the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, 70 Fed.
Reg. 35,625 (June 21, 2005).
206. Diamond Sawblades, 809 F.3d at 629 (citing Diamond Sawblades and Parts
Thereof From China and Korea, 71 Fed. Reg. 39,128 (July 11, 2006)).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 630.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 630-31.
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IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES

Section 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act exists to prevent the unfair or
unlawful importation of goods into the United States. 1 While the
Act prevents a variety of unfair or unlawful imports, section
337(a) (1) (B) focuses on goods that would infringe a valid patent or
copyright.2 17 Based on the statute, it is less clear whether importing a
good that does not infringe upon a patent but yet is used in a way
that does infringe upon a patent only through the inducement of the
seller of that good would similarly violate the Act. That was the
issue in the 2013 case Suprema, Inc. v. International Trade
hc the
h Federal Circuit overturned an ITC
Commission, 211 in which
decision which found that the inducement of infringement
constituted infringement for purposes of the Tariff Act.219

In a

rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit reversed its 2013 decision,
opining that the statute was sufficiently vague and according
Chevron deference to the ITC's decision.220
Section 337 of the Tariff Act authorizes the ITC to investigate
unfair trade practices in the importation of a good that violates a
patent.221 If the ITC concludes that the intended import would
infringe upon a patent, the ITC will issue an exclusion order
preventing the importation.2 22 In this case, Suprema and another
company, Mentalix, sought to import fingerprint scanning devices to
the United States that Suprema manufactured abroad. 2
Cross
Match Technologies Incorporated ("Cross-Match") filed a complaint
with the ITC alleging that the devices violated a patent that they held
for the method of capturing and processing fingerprints and should
be barred from importation.2
Suprema is unique because the machines manufactured by Suprema
do not appear to directly infringe upon the patent as they are sold
without software and thus without the ability to capture or process

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
Id.§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).
742 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013), reh'g en banc, 796 F.3d 1338 (2015).
Id. at 1352, 1357.
Suprema, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n (Suprema Il), 796 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed.

Cir.) (en banc) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 866 (1984)), reh'gen banc, 626 F. App'x 273 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
221. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1).
222. Id. § 1337(d).
223. Suprema II, 796 F.3d at 1341.
224. Id.
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fingerprints.22 ' The machines come with a software development kit
that allows other companies to develop custom software, without
which the machines will not function.2 In this instance, Mentalix,
an American company, develops and integrates that software with
At that point, i.e., after
the machine after importation. 2 27
importation, the combined machine and software allegedly infringe
upon Cross-Match's patent. 22 8
The Tariff Act defines the unlawful importation, sale for
importation, or sale within the United States after importation of
articles that violate a valid patent. 2 29 An administrative law judge
found that the Suprema scanners, when combined with the
American-designed software, infringed Cross-Match's patent and
therefore should be excluded from importation under the Act.2 3 0

Upon review, the ITC "found that Suprema "'willfully blinded" itself
to the infringing nature of Mentalix's activities,' which Suprema
'

'had actively encouraged."' 23

A majority of the en banc court agreed that the required
application of software would, when combined with the imported
machines, infringe upon a valid patent, permitting the ITC to issue
an exclusionary order on the machines.
Judge
Two judges dissented from the majority opinion.
O'Malley and Judge Dyk dissented separately, arguing that
Suprema did not directly induce an infringement upon CrossMatch's patent.2 3' Therefore, the dissenting judges argued that
the court should not permit the exclusionary order as the
machines alone were not unlawfully imported.23
In another major section 337 case this year, Align Technology filed
an investigation against ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, alleging that

225. Id. at 1341-42.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1342.
228. Id.
229. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1) (B) (i) (2012).
230. Suprema II, 796 F.3d at 1342.
231. Id. at 1343 (quoting Certain Biometric Scanning Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA720, USITC Pub. 4366 (Fed. 2013) (Final), Comm'n Op. at 12).
232. Id. at 1349.
233. Id. at 1353-54 (Dyk, J., dissenting); id. at 1354, 1369 (O'Malley, J.,
dissenting).
234. Id. at 1353-54 (Dyk, J., dissenting); id. at 1354, 1369 (O'Malley, J.,
dissenting).
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its imports violated seven of the former company's patents."3
The
case involved aligners used in dentistry to straighten a patient's
teeth. 3 ClearCorrect U.S. produces these aligners with the help of
ClearCorrect Pakistan, which is responsible for digitally designing
them for production in the United States.23 1 ClearCorrect Pakistan
creates digital models that are then transmitted to ClearCorrect
U.S.2 " Align Technology alleged that these digital transmissions
infringed upon its patents.239

The ITC concluded that ClearCorrect violated the Align
Technology patents but that, because the violation occurred wholly
within the United States, it would not sustain a section 337
proceeding.24o
The ITC also found that ClearCorrect Pakistan
contributed to that infringement and thus that they could be included
in an exclusion order.' ClearCorrect appealed that decision. 2
The Federal Circuit emphasized that section 337 is a statute that
focuses on the facilitation of fair trade practices and that trade
referred to material goods.243
Congress enacted section 337 to
"curb[] unfair trade practices" by authorizing the ITC and CBP to
exclude the importation of goods into the U.S. market that
contribute to unfair trade practices. 2 " The jurisdiction of the ITC
extends only to "articles" of trade, as defined in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a). 4 If there is no article in dispute, there can be no unfair
trade, according to the Federal Circuit.2 6 "Here, the only purported
'article' found to have been imported was digital data that was
transferred electronically, i.e., not digital data on a physical medium
such as a compact disk or thumb drive." 24 7 Therefore, data lacking a
physical medium component raises the question whether the term
"article" encompasses electronically transferred data.

235. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1289.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1289-90.
244. Id. at 1289 (quoting Suprema II, 796 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc),
reh'gen banc, 626 F. App'x 273 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
245. Id. at 1289-90 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2012)).
246. Id. at 1290.
247. Id.
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Applying Chevron deference to the ITC decision here, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the statute does not define the term "article"
and thus the ITC was empowered to apply the ordinary or natural
meaning of the word.24" The ITC concluded that article should be
defined as "embrac [ing] a generic meaning that is synonymous with a
2
particular item or thing, such as a unit of merchandise."1

It

concluded that this meant any consumer goods traded in commerce,
5
including digital goods; the Federal Circuit disagreed. o
The Federal Circuit surveyed various dictionary definitions of
"article" during the time of the 1922 Tariff Act and found that "article"
would clearly exclude digital goods. 25 ' The Federal Circuit concluded
that "[t]he aforementioned dictionaries make clear that the ordinary
2
The Federal
meaning of the term 'articles' is 'material things."'25
alternative
are
there
whether
not
is
Circuit clarified that the question
2"
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit determined
definitions available.
that because digital transmissions are not considered goods, they cannot
be used to grant jurisdiction under section 337.254 The Federal Circuit
255
reversed and remanded the decision to the ITC.

In a final significant section 337 case from the 2015 term, the
Federal Circuit addressed the domestic injury requirement of the
statute, 5 which requires that a claimant show "'with respect to the
articles protected by patent,' that there is: (A) significant investment
in plant and equipment; (B) significant employment of labor or
capital; or (C) substantial investment in its exploitation, including
engineering, research and development, or licensing. "257
Although the ITC argued in Lelo, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission2 11 that it occasionally applies a qualitative analysis, the ITC has

248. See id. at 1290-91 (citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476
(1994)) (analyzing the legislative history of the Tariff Act and consulting relevant
dictionaries to determine that "articles" cannot include digital goods).
249. Id. at 1291 (quoting Certain Digital Models, Inv. No. 337-TA-833 (Apr. 3,
2014), Comm'n Op. at 39).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1291-92.
252. Id. at 1293.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1299, 1302.
255. Id. at 1302. The petitioners have filed for a rehearing en banc in this case.
Rehearing En Banc Sought in Clear Correct Case, BINKs, GILSON, & LIONE (Feb. 12,
2016), http://www.brinksgilson.com/rehearing-en-banc-sought-in-clear-correct-case.
256. Lelo Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 786 F.3d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
257. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (2012)).
258. 786 F.3d 879, 879 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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generally interpreted the "significant" or "substantial" requirements of this
section to speak to the overall quantitative amount expended.2 " In Lelo,
the Federal Circuit disagreed with a qualitative assessment. 2
In Lelo, a Canadian company (Standard Innovation Corporation)
that sourced its parts and components for its kinesiotherapy devices
from the United States and other countries, completed assembly of
its products in China, and ultimately sold the products as off-the-shelf
goods in the United States. Lelo is a California corporation that
imports kinesiotherapy devices into the United States. Standard
brought an infringement claim under section 337 against Lelo,
claiming a violation of its patent on the devices. To establish a
domestic industry argument, Standard claimed a significant
qualitative investment in labor and equipment in the United States,
as required by section 337.261
The ITC concluded that the quantitative investment in domestic
industry was modest, which the Federal Circuit interpreted as
insignificant.1 2 Yet, the ITC argued that the qualitative factors, namely
the importance of the goods to the manufacturing process, compensate
for the low quantitative value.26" The Federal Circuit disagreed and held
that "[qlualitative factors cannot compensate for quantitative data that
indicate insignificant investment and employment"2" Accordingly,
because qualitative factors alone cannot sustain a section 337 case, the
Federal Circuit reversed the ITC's decision. 6
CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit had an active term in 2015, hearing cases on
goods as diverse as curtain wall units, fingerprint machines, and
metallic yarn, and legal challenges from induced patent infringement
to reclassification to countervailing duties levied upon non-market
economies. In all of the cases, the court provided its usual thorough
and straightforward analysis, invoking Chevron deference in a majority
of cases and leaving much of the substantive decision making to the
ITC and Commerce, where these cases began.

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 883-84.
Id. at 883.
19 U.S.C. § 337(a) (3) (A).
Lelo, 786 F.3d at 885.
Id.
Id.
Id.

